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Abstract— Nowadays mobile phones and PDAs are part and parcel of our lives. By carrying
a portable mobile device with us all the time we are already living in partial Pervasive Computing
Environment (PCE) that is waiting to be exploited very soon. One of the advantages of pervasive
computing is that it strongly supports the deployment of Location-Based Service(s) (LBSs). In PCE,
there would be many competitive service providers (SPs) trying to sell different or similar LBSs to
users. In order to avail a particular service, it becomes very difficult for a low-computing and resource-
poor mobile device to handle many such SPs at a time, and to identify and securely communicate
with only genuine ones. Our paper establishes a convincing trust model through which secure job
delegation is accomplished. Secure Job delegation and cost effective cryptographic techniques largely
help in reducing the burden on the mobile device to securely communicate with trusted SPs. Our
protocol also provides users privacy protection, replay protection, entity authentication, and message
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. This paper explains our protocol by suggesting one of
the LBSs namely “Secure Automated Taxi Calling Service”.
Keywords: Privacy protection, ubiquitous computing environment, trust model, secure job dele-
gation, location-based services, secure mobile device communications.
1 Introduction
Pervasive computing [1][2] or Ubiquitous computing
means availability of computing and communication re-
sources whenever and wherever we are. A Pervasive
Computing Environment (PCE) is saturated with de-
vices, which compute and communicate “for”, “on be-
half” and “along with” the users in order to provide
some useful services. The user should obtain and make
use of such services seamlessly and comfortably, but
should never be burdened with instructions and inter-
faces on how to handle those devices.
Nowadays mobile phones and PDAs are part and
parcel of our lives. We are now able to communi-
cate whenever and from wherever we are. Apart from
helping us to communicate, these mobile devices would
very soon allow us to interact with other smart de-
vices around us, thus supporting an open PCE. One of
the advantages of pervasive computing environment is
that it would lead to the growth of new breed of ser-
vice providers (SPs) who would offer Location-Based
service(s) (LBSs).
Recently 3G (3rd Generation) [8][9] GPS (Global Po-
sitioning Service) enabled mobile phones [12-15] and
PDAs [11] are being introduced in to the consumer
market. Such mobile devices greatly assist the open
PCE by allowing users to determine their location at
the touch of a button, and download location specific
information like graphical maps and other useful ser-
vices. By sending out our current location informa-
tion, SPs can provide us with services “related to” and
“available at” that location.
Consider a situation where you are approaching a lo-
cation, which has a food court, a movie hall, a discount
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store and many more shops. The mobile device on be-
half of its owner may need to communicate with more
than one SP. Communicating with many SPs, iden-
tifying and authenticating genuine ones, checking the
validity of their digital certificates and signatures (if
in case they are using Public-key Infrastructure (PKI)
[7]), securing the entire transaction and protecting the
owner’s privacy, cannot be handled alone by the low-
computing and resource-poor mobile device. It would
create a huge burden on the mobile device and is cer-
tainly not user-friendly. One other feature of PCE is
“job delegation” among smart devices. A low-computing
device can delegate its job to a trusted high-computing
device/entity.
This paper establishes a secure and privacy enhanced
location-based service reservation protocol and explains
the same by suggesting one of the LBSs namely “Secure
Automated Taxi Calling Service”.
2 LBS: A Secure Automated Taxi Call-
ing Service
2.1 Motivation
In the current taxi calling system, the user through
a telephone call directly interacts with the call center.
As a result some of the call centers in order to pro-
vide quick and personalized services to returning cus-
tomers, maintain travel records (travel history) and de-
tailed profiles of its customers like their phone num-
bers, names, and addresses of frequently visited places
(home, office, shopping malls, etc). But this is in fact
privacy intrusion and violation.
2.2 Protocol Overview
Our simple, efficient and cost effective protocol ad-
dresses the above-mentioned concerns. Our protocol
consists of four entities:
• Users (U)
• Trusted Proxies: Mobile Operators (MO) like AT&T,
BT, Vodafone, NTT-DoCoMo, etc.
• Service Providers: Taxi Control Center (CC) and
its associated Taxis (T)
A user using his GPS enabled mobile phone detects
his current location and requests for a list of services
available at that location. MO takes responsibility on
behalf of users to select, identify, and authenticate the
genuine SPs and also maintains a list of services they
offer at a particular location. It updates this list as
and when required. If the resource-poor mobile device
had to do the above job done by MO, it would create
a huge burden on it. As a result, we can notice that
secure job delegation to MO plays a very critical role.
MO sends the list of available services to user’s mo-
bile phone. User selects ”Taxi Calling” service from
the list. He detects his current location and also iden-
tifies the destination he has to reach on an interactive
map displayed in his GPS enabled mobile phone. He
securely communicates these details to MO as an input
to the taxi calling service. Due to this this Alice need
not remember the phone numbers of many taxi call
centers that operate area wise and foreigner Bob need
not speak the local language to convey his current lo-
cation and destination details.The communications be-
tween user and MO could be via SMS (Short Messaging
Service) messages, MMS (Multimedia Messaging Ser-
vice) messages, XML messages [23] or a more efficient
data communication method employed by MO. The
communications between the user and MO are secured
by implementing cost-effective symmetric-key encryp-
tion and Manipulation Detection Code (MDC). This
avoids the expensive PKI implementations and reduce
the computational overhead on the mobile phone.
MO behaving like a “proxy” processes the request on
behalf of the user, thus greatly reducing the burden on
his mobile phone. MO identifies and authenticates the
genuine SPs and securely sends only the user’s current
location and destination details (but not the identity
of the user) to CC. This protects the privacy of the
user. CC cannot maintain the user’s travel record and
his detailed profile, as it does not know to whom the
service is being offered to. Since MO and CC are re-
source rich entities, the communications between them
are secured by implementing PKI based encryption and
digital signing.
CC, Which keeps track of all its associated taxis, se-
curely communicates with them the current location
and destination details of the user and dispatches an
available taxi closest to user’s current location. The
communications between CC and its associated taxis
are secured by implementing cost-effective symmetric-
key encryption and Manipulation Detection Code (MDC).
The reason being the taxis may carry resource-poor
mobile devices.
2.3 Security Requirements
This section describes the various security require-
ments of our protocol
Users Privacy Protection: privacy is at a greater risk
in PCE where users interact with many smart devices
around them. Users are prone to revealing their lo-
cation and identity information to such devices. This
information could allow SPs to generate detailed pro-
files of the user, his buying interests and trace all his
actions. As a result restricted access to users personal
data [18] should be provided by all protocols executing
in PCE.
Other security requirements include: entity authenti-
cation, replay protection, message authentication, mes-
sage Integrity, and message confidentiality
3 Cryptographic Primitives
This section points out the various cryptographic
primitives utilized in our protocol and related refer-
ences.
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Figure 1: Trust Model and Setup Phase
Key freshness [24], Timestamps [16], Hash function
[6][19][20][21], Message Authentication and integrity us-
ing a MAC [6], Message Authentication and integrity
using encryption and a MDC [6].
4 Protocol Description
4.1 Notations
We state all the notations used in this paper in Ta-
bles 1&2. A brief description of an AVL system, which
would be referred in the subsequent sections is as fol-
lows:
AVL System: Automatic Vehicle Location system
includes Global Positioning System (GPS) with Geo-
graphical Information System (GIS). It provides preci-
sion time and position data for a vehicle or its trailer
to a regional or national control center that operates
and manages fleet movements. The GIS element of the
AVL system provides fleet managers with on-the-spot
information regarding a vehicle and its driver’s where-
abouts [4].
4.2 Trust Model and Setup Phase
This section describes the trust model and the setup
phase needed to execute our protocol. In PCE many
smart devices, which could be genuine or malicious
compute and communicate with each other. To ensure
secure transactions and key distribution, establishing
an efficient and a convincing trust model is very much
required. Also with existence of such a trust model,
it would be lot easier for the mobile device to dele-
gate their work to a nearby trusted high-computing
and resource-rich entity like MO, which processes the
request on behalf of the them.
Figure 1 depicts the Trust Model and the Setup Phase.
4.2.1 Trust between users and mobile operator
User installs software in his mobile phone. The soft-
ware is required to execute various procedures involved
in this protocol. User can either download the soft-
ware through MO’s official website or by approaching
the nearest MO’s licensed customer service center. The
software helps to generate a master secret key shared
between user (u) and MO (MKum). MKum is stored
in the user’s mobile phone and is also stored in the
database of MO, probably with user’s mobile phone
number being the index or the reference for such a
database entry. As a result for all users, MO gener-
ates a unique master shared secret key.
Why Trust the Mobile Operator?
In the current mobile communications paradigm we
already trust MO a lot, as it handles all our voice and
data communications. It maintains a record of each
Table 1: Notation
Notation Description
MO Mobile Operator. Establishes mo-
bile communications network in-
frastructure. E.g., AT&T, BT,
Vodafone, NTT-DoCoMo, etc
IDm Identity of MO
DCertm Digital Certificate of MO
SKm Private Key of MO
PKm Public Key of MO
U All Subscribers of MO
u One particular subscriber who has
registered for Taxi Calling Service.
u ∈ U
MPu GPS enabled Mobile Phone of u
PNu Mobile Phone Number of u. It can
also be the Identity of u
CLocnu Current Location of u
Destu Destination to be reached by u
MKum Master secret Key shared between
u and MO
Kum Secret session Key shared between
u and MO
CC Taxi Control Center, keeps track of
all its associated taxis
IDc Identity of CC
DCertc Digital Certificate of CC
SKc Private Key of CC
PKc Public Key of CC
T All the taxis associated with CC
t One particular taxi among all the
taxis, considered for easy explana-
tion of the protocol. t ∈ T
IDt Identity of t
RNt Registration Number of t
Ktc Secret Key shared between t and
CC
Tmrtu Indicates the time that would be
taken by t to reach CLocnu
Sidx Unique Service ID of service x
TRid Transaction Reference ID, which is
Unique and Randomly generated
for every new LBS transaction
ry y -th Unique Random Number
tsxy y -th Timestamp generated by an
entity x
Ack1 Your request is being processed,
please wait
Ack2 The following taxi has been
dispatched
Mxy = {m} y-th Message m sent in open by an
entity x. This message is visible to
everyone connected to the network
PkiSSKx(M) Public Key based digital Signature
function on messageM with private
key of an entity x
PkiEPKx(M) Public Key based Encryption func-
tion on message M with public key
of an entity x
SymEKxy (M) Symmetric Key based Encryption
function on message M with secret
key shared between an entity x and
y
H() One Way Hash Function like SHA-1
(Secure Hash Algorithm) [19], [21]
H(M) Hash value or message digest of a
message M
HKxy (M) Keyed Hash function on messageM
with secret key shared between an
entity x and y
subscriber’s call details (incoming and outgoing call num-
bers, talk time, etc), contact information (home and
office addresses, etc), social security number, bank ac-
count and credit card details, etc. It even has the capa-
bility to easily determine our current location and tap
in to our communications. But what protects us from
MO turning hostile is that it has to very strictly ad-
here to and follow legal, security and privacy policies
imposed by the law. Thus so far we have little prob-
lems in trusting MO. Our protocol extends this trust
in MO to secure LBS transactions. This approach is
very practical and easily deployable, as the current mo-
bile communications infrastructure is widely spread and
highly stable.
It is very convenient for mobile device to trust one
single entity like MO rather than validating many SPs
and then trusting them. It is desirable to have our de-
tails like preferences and requests passed on to one sin-
gle trusted entity rather than having our details stored
with many SPs, who may be genuine or malicious.
4.2.2 Trust between mobile operator and taxi
control center
For commercial gains both MO and taxi control cen-
ter (CC) sign a business contract and mutually agree to
provide this Automated Taxi Calling Service. A similar
deal can be made with other SPs, whom MO trusts. To
secure the communications between MO and CC dur-
ing the protocol execution we assume the existence of a
trusted Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). MO obtains
digital certificate (DCertm) and private key (SKm).
Similarly CC also obtains DCertc and SKc from a Cer-
tificate Authority (CA). We assume that MO and CC
have large computing resources. During the protocol
execution they can easily, and very efficiently perform
expensive tasks like public-key encryption, decryption,
and digital certificate and signature verifications. MO
stores DCertc and CC Similarly stores and DCertm.
4.2.3 Trust between taxi control center and
taxis
Taxi control center (CC) keeps track of all its associ-
ated taxis (T ). CC generates secret Key (Ktc) shared
between each taxi (t) and CC, which will be used for
securing the communications between them. Ktc can
be stored in the AVL system available in the taxi and is
also stored in the database of CC, probably with iden-
tity of taxi (IDt) being the index or the reference for
such a database entry. As a result all taxis receive a
unique shared secret key generated by CC.
4.2.4 Analysis
One may feel that, by solely utilizing PKI implemen-
tations throughout the protocol we can avoid consider-
able overhead involved in managing the unique shared
keys of all taxis and users at MO and CC respectively.
But since MO and CC are assumed to have large com-
puting resources, storing large number of shared se-
cret keys would not be much of a burden on them.
Also, this model avoids the expensive PKI implementa-
tions at users and at taxis, as they carry low-computing
and resource-poor devices. It is very well proved in [5]
that symmetric key implementations are much simpler,
faster and less computationally expensive than PKI im-
plementations.
4.3 Periodic Taxi Information Update Phase
All taxis via the AVL system periodically and con-
tinuously communicate certain details with CC. This
frequently sent update information includes identity of
the taxi (IDt), availability status (vacant or not), and
current location, etc. Currently most of the Taxi Call-
ing Service Agencies employ this method of keeping
track of their associated taxis. CC stores this update
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Figure 2: User LBS Request Processing Phase
information in its database with IDt being the index
or the reference for such entries.
4.4 Request Processing Phase
Figure 2 depicts this phase.
4.4.1 STEP 1
User (u) enters the secret PIN (Personal Identifi-
cation Number) to authenticate himself to his mobile
phone. This prevents unauthorized communications in
the event his mobile phone is stolen or being tampered
with. The above option is currently available in all the
mobile phones. User, using his GPS enabled mobile
phone detects his current location (CLocnu). User,
using the master shared secret key MKum performs
symmetric-key encryption and MDC on message Mu1
and sends it to MO. Mu1 contains a request for a list
of available services at CLocnu. User also generates
a session key Kum using a keyed hash function of a
unique random number (r1) concatenated with his mo-
bile phone number (PNu).
a = {tsu1 , r1, CLocnu}
Mu1 = {tsu1 , PNu, SymEMKum(a||H(a))}
Kum = HMKum(r1||PNu)
Security Analysis
Entity Authentication, Message Authentica-
tion, Integrity, and Confidentiality: The above
equation provides entity Authentication, message au-
thentication, integrity, and confidentiality by utilizing
symmetric-key encryption and Manipulation Detection
Code (MDC).
Replay Protection: Unlike wire-based communi-
cation systems where lines can be put up until they
obliterate the sky, each wireless system requires its own
unique slice of the limited radio spectrum. In order to
get the most out of its assigned slice of the radio spec-
trum, a wireless system must be carefully timed and
synchronized [22]. As a result in the current mobile
communications scenario (like TDMA technology) the
clock of the mobile phones are synchronized with the
clock of MO. This aspect greatly supports the use of
timestamp [16] as nonce to prevent replay attacks.
Key Freshness: Long-term master key MKum is
used only once at the beginning of the session to pre-
vent key compromise due to extensive use. Instead
MKum is used to generate a short-term session key
Kum. Kum is used to protect the rest of the commu-
nications between the user and MO for that particular
session only.
4.4.2 STEP 2
MO receives Mu1 and also the phone number of the
user (PNu) as a part of the incoming message informa-
tion from STEP 1. MO checks PNu and retrieves the
corresponding MKum from its database and decrypts
Mu1 . MO obtains r1 and CLocnu. Using r1, PNu,
and MKum, MO generates the session key Kum. Us-
ing Kum, MO performs symmetric-key encryption and
MDC on message Mm1 and sends it to the user. Mm1
contains a list of services available at CLocnu.
Kum = HMKum(r1||PNu)
b = {tsm1 , SidR, SidT , SidH}
d = {b||H(b)}
Mm1 = {tsm1 , IDm, SymEKum(d)}
4.4.3 STEP 3
User’s mobile phone receives messageMm1 from STEP
2. Mobile phone checks IDm and retrieves the recently
generated Kum and decrypts Mm1 . Mm1 can be dis-
played as follows in the mobile phone:
The list of services available at CLocnu is
SidR: Restaurant Information Service
SidT : Taxi Calling Service
SidH : Hotel Information Service
Please Select your choice
Since user requires Taxi Calling Service, he selects
SidT . User using his GPS enabled mobile phone de-
tects CLocnu and identifies the destinationDestu to be
reached on an interactive map displayed in the mobile
phone. Using Kum, user performs symmetric-key en-
cryption and MDC on messageMu2 and sends it to the
MO.Mu2 contains a service ID selected by the user and
other information related to that service like CLocnu
and Destu.
f = {tsu2 , SidT , CLocnu, Destu}
Mu2 = {tsu2 , PNu, SymEKum(f ||H(f))}
4.4.4 STEP 4
MO receives Mu2 and decrypts it using Kum. MO
checks the user’s preference as taxi calling service (SidT ).
MO creates a unique random transaction ID (TRid) for
this particular LBS transaction. Unique TRid, plays a
vital role in identifying one entire Taxi Calling Service
transaction for the user. Using Kum, MO sends mes-
sage Mm2 to the user. Mm2 contains TRid, SidT and
an acknowledgement to the user stating that his request
is being processed.
Ack1 = Your request is being processed, please wait
g = {tsm2 , Ack1, SidT , TRid}
Mm2 = {tsm2 , IDm, SymEKum(g||H(g))}
User receives Mm2 from STEP 4. Mobile phone
(MPu) using Kum decrypts Mm2 . MPu obtains TRid.
User can now use TRid as a reference to easily and
quickly cancel this request or update his current loca-
tion at a later stage (before the taxi could reach him).
MO using its private-key (SKm) and CC’s public-
key (PKc) sends a PKI based encrypted signed message
Mm3 to CC.Mm3 contains service ID, its corresponding
transaction ID, current location and destination details
of the user. It can be noticed that identity of the user
like his phone number is never sent to CC and therefore
CC can never know whose location details are being
sent. This protects the privacy of the user. Its TRid,
which identifies this transaction. In the current call
taxi scenario, user’s phone number, his name or address
is used to identify the transaction leading to privacy
intrusion.
j = {tsm3 , SidT , TRid, CLocnu, Destu}
Mm3 = {tsm3 , IDm, PkiEPKc(PkiSSKm(j))}
Security Analysis
Entity Authentication, Message Authentica-
tion, Integrity, and Confidentiality: According
to our Trust Model, MO and CC have enough comput-
ing resources to carry out expensive PKI implementa-
tions. Public-key based implementations like encryp-
tion and digital signature provide entity authentica-
tion, message authentication, integrity, and confiden-
tiality.
4.4.5 STEP 5
CC receives Mm3 , and decrypts it using its private-
key (SKc) and verifies the signature. Now CC knows
the current location of the user CLocnu and the desti-
nation he has to reach Destu. By comparing CLocnu
and already available current location details of all its
associated taxis (via the Periodic Taxi Information Up-
date Phase), CC detects, selects and dispatches a taxi
(t) that is nearest to CLocnu. CC updates its database
by including some of the reserved taxi’s details like reg-
istration number (RNt), driver’s name, date, and time,
probably with TRid being the index or the reference
for such an entry. This database entry may be used
as a receipt for this particular transaction or for any
payment transactions at a later stage. CC using its
private-key (SKc) and MO’s public-key (PKm) sends
an PKI based encrypted signed message Mc1 to MO.
Mc1 contains identity of CC, TRid, registration num-
ber of the reserved taxi (RNt) and the time taken by t
to reach CLocnu (Tmrtu).
p = {tsc1 , TRid, RNt, Tmrtc}
Mc1 = {tsc1 , IDc, PkiEPKm(PkiSSKc(p))}
Simultaneously, CC using the shared secret key Ktc
performs symmetric-key encryption and MDC on mes-
sageMc2 and sends it to the reserved taxi (t). Through
Mc2 , TRid, CLocnu, and Destu are securely commu-
nicated to t.
q = {tsc2 , TRid, CLocnu, Destu}
Mc2 = {tsc2 , IDc, SymEKtc(q||H(q))}
t receives Mc2 , checks for IDc and retrieves the cor-
responding Ktc. Using Ktc, t decrypts Mc2 . Now t
knows the CLocnu, and Destu, which are sufficient to
pick up the user from his current location.
4.4.6 STEP 6
MO receivesMc1 from STEP 5 and decrypts it using
its private-key SKm and verifies the signature on Mc1 .
MO checks for the received TRid in its database and
retrieves the corresponding user’s mobile phone num-
ber and recently generated session key Kum. Using
Kum, MO sends message Mm4 to the user. Mm4 con-
tains an acknowledgement stating that a taxi has been
dispatched, identity of CC, TRid, registration number
of the reserved taxi (RNt) and the time taken by t to
reach CLocnu (Tmrtu).
Ack2 = The following taxi has been dispatched
v = {tsm4 , TRid, Ack2, RNt, Tmrtc}
w = {v||H(v)}
Mm4 = {tsm4 , IDm, SymEKum(w)}
User receives Mm4 . Using Kum he decrypts Mm4 .
User stores TRid, and RNt, which can used as a re-
ceipt for this particular transaction or for any payment
transactions at a later stage. User reads Tmrtc and
waits for the reserved taxi t.
Security Analysis The security analysis done at STEP
1, 2, & 4 holds good for this STEP. Additional analysis
is as below.
Privacy Protection It can be noticed that TRid
is never sent in open. It is always well encrypted and
securely communicated among the four entities. In the
current taxi calling scenario identity of (e.g., name,
or phone number) the user is used to identify one en-
tire transaction. This does not protect user’s privacy.
Whereas in our protocol a unique TRid is used to iden-
tify one unique transaction, thus protecting user’s pri-
vacy.
4.5 Pickup Phase
Reserved taxi (t) reaches curent location of the user.
User has already obtained the registration number of
the reserved taxi (RNt) via the message Mm4 . The
message Mm4 has been securely communicated to the
user. Looking if registration number of the arrived taxi
equals RNt, user can identify, authenticate and trust
the arrived taxi as t else the arrived taxi is not the right
taxi dispatched by CC.
5 Comparison with Related Works
Most of the pervasive computing projects [27-30] be-
ing carried out at various universities and research in-
stitutes deal in closed pervasive computing environ-
ments (PCE) like home networking or Smart Spaces
in buildings. In such closed environments, interacting
smart devices are mostly under the control of a trusted
server (for e.g., a home server) and with establishment
of proprietary trust model every device can easily trust
and communicate with every other device. Key distri-
bution, access control, privacy protection and security
policies for securing the communications can be easily
accomplished in such closed environments.
But in an open PCE (for e.g., streets, highways, etc.)
the scenario is completely different Our protocol sug-
gests a convincing trust model in such environments to
assist in key distribution, access control, privacy pro-
tection and secure communication. [18] [23] [25] [26]
[30-34] describe the need and importance of privacy
protection in PCE and LBSs and also suggest privacy
protection methods, which can be broadly categorized
as follows:
5.1 Identity Management [26]:
In this method users interact with other smart de-
vices through pseudonyms. [31] describes the draw-
backs of this method. The user has to choose carefully,
towards which party he uses which VID and when he
has to change this VID. This approach creates burden
on the user’s mobile device to decide and choose the
appropriate VID depending on the interacting SP.
5.2 Adhering to the privacy policies issued by
the law [32] [34]:
[35] describes the drawbacks of adhering to privacy
policies approach. In this scenario, resource-rich mobile
operator can make sure that the SPs are adhering to
the policies by verifying their claims on behalf of the
user’s mobile devices.
5.3 Use of Proxies:
According to [23] the proxy can conceal from the SP
the mobile device’s mobileID and protect its identity.
But the paper fails to mention about how to establish
or envisage such a trusted proxy. Our paper clearly
justifies the consideration of MO to be such a trusted
proxy. In our protocol the mobile device neither stores
a list of trusted SPs nor their corresponding keys.
6 Conclusion
The advantages of this protocol are as follows: Sim-
ple, involves less user interactions, involves secure del-
egation of duties among the entities, automation leads
to speedy taxi calling service as it involves less human
interactions, in case of a legal inquiry the entire trans-
action can traced using TRid, the taxi control center
cannot maintain users travel record and their profiles
because they would never know the users phone num-
ber, this protects users privacy, TRid speeds up the
process of cancellation of a request and current location
update of walking users, avoids expensive PKI imple-
mentations at user end and at taxis end as they have
low-computing and resource-poor mobile devices, au-
tomation reduces the cost involved in establishing taxi
call centers and manpower to manage them.
There are many advantages of Secure Automated
Taxi Calling Service and could be a killer application
as it speeds up the call taxi process. This facility would
be greatly sought by both public and taxi drivers. For
public it could be a quick, useful and convenient ser-
vice, which also protects their privacy. For the taxi
drivers, they would never pass by a waiting customer
unnoticed. This could mean more money to them. It
could be a good revenue generator for the mobile oper-
ators and the taxi call center through commissions for
every transaction.
Finally this protocol adheres to pervasive computing
requirements, as there is a secure delegation of work be-
tween low-computing devices and high-computing de-
vices. The user passes on his request to the trusted
MO, which then identifies and authenticates the gen-
uine service providers, and establishes a secure com-
munication with them on behalf of the user. As a re-
sult the mobile device can securely handle many ser-
vice providers at a time. The load on the users mobile
phone is greatly reduced by employing cheap yet strong
cryptographic techniques like hash functions, message
authentication and integrity using symmetric-key en-
cryption and a MDC in order to secure the commu-
nication channel. This protocol would certainly serve
the purpose for most of the Location-Based Services in
open pervasive computing environment.
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